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National Research University Higher School of EconomicsResearch DepartmentsInstitute for Industrial and Market StudiesEventsResearch Seminar on Diversity and Development Anne Meng "Autocratic Constitutions and Leadership Succession in Dictatorial Regimes"

Events

Research Seminar on Diversity and Development Anne Meng "Autocratic Constitutions and Leadership Succession in Dictatorial Regimes"

Event ended

HSE International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development (ICSID) and NES Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interactions are pleased to announce their next joint Research Seminar on Diversity and Development.The event is held jointly with the seminar “Political Economy”.

Anne Meng, Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics, University of Virginia, will present her paper "Autocratic Constitutions and Leadership Succession in Dictatorial Regimes" .

The seminar will take place in the HSE building at 26-4 Shabolovka str., room 4413, at 5.00 p.m. on Tuesday, September 19, 2017.

Working language of the seminar is English.

We would like to ask everyone who requires an HSE pass to send an e-mail to Oksana Antsiferova oantsiferova(at)hse.ru (stating your name, surname, your affiliation and contact e-mail address) until 5 p.m., September 18.

Abstract: Under what conditions can autocratic regimes undergo successful leadership  transitions? The problem of transferring power has long been identified as one of the key challenges of continued authoritarian rule. Two main mechanisms that have emerged as potential solutions for autocratic succession are the presence of a ruling party and the implementation of hereditary succession. However, using a global dataset of autocratic successions from 1946-2015, I show that hereditary successions are incredibly rare in modern dictatorships, and that the presence of a ruling party is not a strong predictor of peaceful leadership succession. Instead, I argue that constitutional rules play a critical role in regulating the process of autocratic succession. I show evidence of this argument using original data on constitutional amendments outlining succession rules and the appointment of a de facto successor in 47 African countries from 1960-2005. I find that regimes that have formal succession rules written into the constitution and leaders who designate a clear successor are significantly more likely to undergo multiple leadership successions – regardless of whether the regime has a long-standing ruling party. Rather than introducing the crown prince problem, planning for leadership succession seems to be a stabilizing force for continued autocratic rule.

We look forward to seeing you!

tel:   +7 (495) 772 95 90*22029 
 

Kind regards,

ICSID and NES CSDSI Team