Research Seminar on Diversity and Development Noah Buckley-Farlee: "Calculating Corruption: Political Competition and Bribery under Authoritarianism"

Noah Buckley-Farlee, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the HSE International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development, will present his paper " Calculating Corruption: Political Competition and Bribery under Authoritarianism"

The seminar will take place in the HSE building at 26-4 Shabolovka str., room 4322, at 5 p.m. on Tuesday, February 28, 2017.

Working language of the seminar is English.

We would like to ask everyone who requires an HSE pass to send an e-mail to Oksana Antsiferova (stating your name, surname, your affiliation and contact e-mail address) until 10 a.m., February 28.

Abstract: Why do some authoritarian regimes exhibit high levels of corruption, while others produce very little? In this study, I show how corruption is used as a signal of performance and loyalty in autocratic regimes. I find that elites in non-democratic regimes reduce corruption in the face of political competitiveness. I test this theory using extensive micro-level data on the public's experiences with bribery in contemporary Russia. This data set is comprised of over 180,000 responses to public opinion surveys from 2002-2016 in Russia's subnational units. Identification of the causal effect of political competition on corruption is achieved with the use of an exogenously-determined electoral calendar--I show how the scheduled end of a term in office is an exogenous positive shock to political competition for authoritarian leaders in Russian regions, a shock that decreases experienced bribery by over 13% in those years. A wide array of alternative measures including novel search engine data and crime statistics support my conclusions. These findings have implications for our understanding of autocratic politics, corruption, and studies of Russia.

We look forward to seeing you!

tel:   +7 (495) 772 95 90*22029

e-mail: oantsiferova@hse.ru