HSE Research Seminar on Political Economy Aleksandr Demin "Why Does Persistance Happen (and Not)? A Model of Institutions and Culture in Long-Run Economic Development"
HSE International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development (ICSID) and NES Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interactions are pleased to announce their next joint Research Seminar on Diversity and Development.The event is held jointly with the seminar “Political Economy”.
speaker: Aleksandr Demin (New York University)
topic: Why Does Persistance Happen (and Not)? A Model of Institutions and Culture in Long-Run Economic Development
The seminar will take place in the HSE building at 11 Pokrovsky blvd., room S1003, at 5.00 p.m. on Tuesday, January 21, 2020.
Working language of the seminar is English.
If you don't have a HSE picture ID, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org to order a pass for the seminar before 12:00, Tuesday, January 21.
Abstract: Recent studies have convincingly shown that history matters for long-run development through various mechanisms whenever it is observed. What are the conditions for a decision to have persistent effects? I develop a theory of how formal political institutions and cultural transmission contribute to long-run effects. In the model, citizens select contributions to private and public goods, while the political elite decides on the expropriation and enforcement of public goods provision. The game is played in two periods with a stochastic social transformation occurring in between. First, the model shows how initially weak institutions contribute to the negative developmental effects. Second, the conditions for the persistence of cooperation on public goods with imperfect information are characterized. Importantly, transmission of beliefs works together with enforcing institutions, sustaining each other.
We look forward to seeing you!
ICSID and NES CSDSI