HSE Research Seminar on Political Economy James Tremewan "Ambiguous Policies and Correlated Preferences"
You are cordially invited to attend the joint seminar of Higher School of Economics on political economy, International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development (ICSID) and NES Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interaction (NES CSDSI).
Speaker: James Tremewan (Auckland University).
Coauthors: Juha Tolvanen (Auckland University), Alexander Wagner (Auckland University)
Ambiguous Policies and Correlated Preferences"
The seminar will take place in the HSE building at 11 Pokrovsky blvd., room S1003, at 5.00 p.m. on Tuesday, January 28, 2020.
Working language of the seminar is English.
If you don't have a HSE picture ID, please contact email@example.com to order a pass for the seminar before 12:00, Tuesday, January 28.
See the web-page of the seminar http://economics.hse.ru/en/demat/politeconeng
Abstract: There are many popular accounts of candidates winning elections with markedly ambiguous platforms. Clear empirical evidence regarding ambiguous platforms as well as the reasons for their attractiveness is however quite limited. We test a novel mechanism that explains the success of ambiguous platforms in an equilibrium model with fully rational players. In a citizen-candidate model of electoral competition, we show that if policy preferences are correlated in a society, this correlation can lead candidates to run on ambiguous platforms and voters to support them. In a laboratory experiment, we show that when voters' and candidates' preferences are correlated, ambiguous platforms gain notable support and can even win elections. Moreover, leveraging on the heterogeneity of cognitive ability of players in the game, we provide direct support for the underlying mechanism which drives the use and support of ambiguous platforms.
We look forward to seeing you!
ICSID and NES CSDSI