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AMEC 2020

18 ноября Институт анализа предприятий и рынков в рамках конференции Analytics for Management and Economics (AMEC 2020) представил специальную сессию “Public Procurement”, в которой помимо сотрудников ИАПР приняли участие наши коллеги и партнеры: Юрай Немец (Masaryk University & Matej Bel University), Ольга Валиева (Институт экономики и организации промышленного производства СО РАН, НГУ) и Тюнде Татрай (Corvinus University of Budapest).

На сегодняшний день государственные закупки составляют значительную часть расходов государственного бюджета и ВВП в развитых и развивающихся странах. Сессия “Public Procurement” объединила российских и зарубежных практиков, исследователей и PhD-студентов, занимающихся тематикой государственных закупок. Во время этой сессии были рассмотрены наиболее распространенные проблемы сферы государственных закупок, а также возможные пути повышения эффективности этого сектора на примере различных стран.
Всего во время сессии было презентовано пять докладов, два из которых представили сотрудники ИАПР.

  • Юлия Родионова, Андрей Яковлев, Ольга Балаева и Андрей Ткаченко “Problems and efficiency of public procurement system from the participants’ perspective”
    Аннотация: This paper examines the key problems and assesses the effectiveness of the Russian public procurement system. Public procurement accounts for a significant portion of government spending and GDP in developed and developing countries. In Russia, procurement costs, including procurement by state-owned enterprises, amounted to 31.6 trillion roubles in 2019, or 29% of GDP at current prices [Accounts Chamber, 2020]. The large scale of procurement requires control over their effective spending, clarity, and unambiguous legal requirements for all participants in the procurement process. The experience of 2020 has also shown the importance of flexibility in public procurement legislation, especially in emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic, when fast procurement is vital. The main focus of regulation in this area in Russia is traditionally based on combating corruption and ensuring transparency in procurement. To achieve these goals, the procurement process is strictly regulated with control over compliance with the procurement procedure, rules for interaction with participants, deadlines, etc. But the result of the purchase, including the ability to meet the current demand, is still largely "behind the scenes" of the current legislation. Practitioners and researchers in the field of public procurement are increasingly talking about the need to shift the focus from strict regulation of the procurement process to improving procurement efficiency.

  • Павел Пронин, Андрей Ткаченко и Андрей Яковлев “Political power and entry barriers at public procurement markets”
    Аннотация: The activity of regional (sub-national) actors is an essential source of initiative and dynamism. Different resources are available for regional governments with public procurement (PP) contracts becoming a policy tool with growing importance. However, the allocation of PP can be the source not only for economic development but also for rent-seeking (Szakonyi 2018). In this paper, using unique data for Russia, we analyse the impact of previous experience of regional governors on the allocation of PP contracts between local and external suppliers. Contrary to the previous studies on regional protectionism, we make the main focus on the public procurement and especially on the allocation of contracts to the firms located in two cities – Moscow (country’s capital) and Saint Petersburg (second largest city and city of origin for both Russian presidents since 2000 – Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev – as well as for many pivotal members of federal political elite). We focus on Moscow and St. Petersburg firms as the concentration of political power in the federal center during the early 2000s has made the enterprises, that are connected to the federal government, “the most effective lobbyists”. These firms gained higher bargaining positions and received much more preferential treatments comparing to the firms without federal connections. As some regional governors allocate substantially more contracts to Moscow and St Petersburg (MSP) firms than others, our research question is – “How personal characteristics of regional governors can explain the variation of public procurement allocation in Russian regions?”.