SIDE - ISLE 2012 - EIGHT ANNUAL CONFERENCE

IIMS researchers Svetlana Avdasheva and Polina Kryuchkova presented their paper "Public and Private Law Enforcement under a High Risk of Type I Errors: the Russian Case" at the 8^th Annual Conference of the Italian Society of Law and Economics (SIDE-ISLE)which took place in Rome, Italy, on December 13^th-15^th, 2012.

IIMS researchers Svetlana Avdasheva and Polina Kryuchkova presented their paper "Public and Private Law Enforcement under a High Risk of Type I Errors: the Russian Case" at the 8^th Annual Conference of the Italian Society of Law and Economics (SIDE-ISLE)which took place in Rome, Italy, on December 13^th-15^th, 2012.

"Public and Private Law Enforcement under a High Risk of Type I Errors: the Russian Case"
Abstract

This paper considers the private and social costs and benefits of selective public enforcement of the law (enforcement by a public authority based on the complaints of private parties) compared to private and ‘pure’ public enforcement. The theoretical framework reflects the specific features of the Russian law enforcement system. Under certain conditions, selective public enforcement is privately desirable; however, from the social point of view, it underperforms compared to both private and ‘pure’ public enforcement if acting on the complaints of interested parties results in an increase in the probability of Type I errors. In Russia, consumer protection and labour law are examples of legislation where private enforcement may provide increased deterrence than public enforcement and is privately preferable. In contrast, antitrust law is an example of legislation where private enforcement is completely crowded out by formally public enforcement but ‘pure’ public enforcement is largely replaced by selective enforcement.