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Events

Research Seminar on Diversity and Development Alexei Zakharov "Strategic voting and turnout"

12+
*recommended age
Event ended

HSE International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development (ICSID) and NES Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interactions are pleased to announce their next joint Research Seminar on Diversity and Development. The event is held jointly with the seminar “Political Economy”.Alexei Zakharov (HSE) will present his paper "Strategic voting and turnout"  (co-authored by Kivanc Akoz (HSE))
The seminar will take place in the HSE building at  11 Pokrovsky blvd., room S1003,  at 5.00 p.m. on Tuesday, February 18, 2020. Working language of the seminar is English.
If you don't have a HSE picture ID, please contact political.economy.hse@gmail.com to order a pass for the seminar before 12:00, Tuesday, February 18.Abstract: Elections with multiple candidates often feature a single pro-government as well as multiple oppositon candidates, with the opposition electorate being polarized between various opposition camps. In our work, we use a strategic voting model to study the effect of this polarization on turnout and candidate chances of winning. We find that the effect cruciually depends on whether the opposition voters coordinate on one of the candidates. In that case, polarization decreases turnout and the probability of opposition candidate winning; however, if the opposition voters vote sincerely, polarization can increase turnout due to a smaller free-ride effect.We look forward to seeing you!Kind regards,
ICSID and NES CSDSI

Международный центр изучения институтов и развития НИУ ВШЭ (МЦИИР) и Лаборатория исследования социальных отношений и многообразия общества РЭШ (ЛИСОМО РЭШ) рады объявить об очередном Семинаре по разнообразию и развитию. Мероприятие проводится совместно с семинаром "Политическая экономика".

С докладом "Strategic voting and turnout"  выступит Алексей Захаров (НИУ ВШЭ). Соавтор: Киванч Акоз (НИУ ВШЭ).

Семинар состоится 18 февраля (вторник)  2020 г. в 17:00 по адресу: Здание НИУ ВШЭ на  Покровском бульваре 11, корп. S, ауд. S1013.
Рабочий язык: английский.
Вход на семинар - свободный, приглашаются все желающие. Если Вам необходим пропуск на территорию ВШЭ, пишите на political.economy.hse@gmail.com до 12:00 18 февраля

Аннотация докладаElections with multiple candidates often feature a single pro-government as well as multiple oppositon candidates, with the opposition electorate being polarized between various opposition camps.In our work, we use a strategic voting model to study the effect of this polarization on turnout and candidate chances of winning. We find that the effect cruciually depends on whether the opposition voters coordinate on one of the candidates. In that case, polarization decreases turnout and the probability of opposition candidate winning; however, if the opposition voters vote sincerely, polarization can increase turnout due to a smaller free-ride effect.

Ждём Вас на нашем семинаре! 
С уважением,
Команда ЛИСОМО РЭШ и МЦИИР ВШЭ